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Evaluating Health Information Technology’s Clinical Effects
Abstract
In 2009 the federal government appropriated $34 billion in stimulus-related funding to promote the
“meaningful use” of health information technology among Medicare and Medicaid providers and hospitals.
One of the key elements of this technology is the adoption of computerized physician order entry (CPOE)
systems for inpatient drug prescribing. The potential for CPOE to improve prescribing patterns and prevent
adverse events is large, and as yet, unrealized. Amidst enthusiasm for the benefits of CPOE, providers and
policymakers are becoming aware that CPOE could introduce new errors into the system and cannot simply
be assumed to “work.” This Issue Brief reports on the experience of one hospital system that used its CPOE to
reduce the incidence of a serious drug interaction. This rigorous test of a specific CPOE intervention shows
that an electronic alert system can be effective in changing prescribing, but may also have unintended
consequences for patient safety.
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Editor’s note: In 2009 the federal government appropriated $34 billion in 
stimulus-related funding to promote the “meaningful use” of health information 
technology among Medicare and Medicaid providers and hospitals. One of 
the key elements of this technology is the adoption of computerized physician 
order entry (CPOE) systems for inpatient drug prescribing. The potential for 
CPOE to improve prescribing patterns and prevent adverse events is large, and 
as yet, unrealized. Amidst enthusiasm for the benefits of CPOE, providers and 
policymakers are becoming aware that CPOE could introduce new errors into the 
system and cannot simply be assumed to “work.” This Issue Brief reports on the 
experience of one hospital system that used its CPOE to reduce the incidence of a 
serious drug interaction. This rigorous test of a specific CPOE intervention shows 
that an electronic alert system can be effective in changing prescribing, but may 
also have unintended consequences for patient safety.
Several studies have shown that CPOE, paired with computerized clinical 
decision support, can reduce medication errors in hospitalized patients. The 
concept is intuitively appealing: for example, CPOE can eliminate errors due 
to bad handwriting, and its underlying decision support software can flag 
incorrect dosages and identify potentially harmful drug interactions. Alerts pop 
up automatically on the computer screen to notify the prescriber about potential 
problems and to suggest safer alternatives. 
• However, the clinical effects of a CPOE system depend critically on how 
physicians use and react to it. An ongoing challenge for CPOE implementation 
is to alert the prescriber to clinically significant errors and adverse events, 
without overwhelming the prescriber with alerts of little practical significance. 
Studies show that clinicians exhibit “alert fatigue” and tend to ignore most pop-
up alerts.
• To prevent adverse drug events, CPOE systems can also produce “hard-stop” 
alerts, in which the medication order is blocked until the prescriber takes steps 
(usually calling the pharmacy) to override the alert. Hard stops may be more 
effective than “soft” alerts in preventing adverse events, such as serious drug 
interactions, but also run the risk of delaying or blocking necessary care.
Computerized Physician 
Order Entry (CPOE) offers 
technical solution to many 
medication safety issues, 
but it is not a panacea
Continued on next page.
Researchers implement and 
evaluate a CPOE intervention 
for a significant drug 
interaction
To test the effectiveness of a specific CPOE intervention, Strom and colleagues 
chose a drug interaction with serious consequences, and implemented a nearly 
hard-stop CPOE alert. The drugs they chose were warfarin (an anticoagulant, 
also known as Coumadin™) and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (TMP/Sulfa, 
an antibiotic, also known as Bactrim™ or Septra™). Patients who take both 
medications are much more likely to develop bleeding from the warfarin. To 
reduce the likelihood of these drugs being prescribed together, the Hospital of the 
University of Pennsylvania had implemented a policy in which pharmacists notify 
the clinician by phone about the risk of bleeding when the drugs are prescribed 
concurrently. Despite the intervention, some clinicians continued to prescribe the 
drugs together.
• The hard-stop alert appeared as a pop-up window that notified the clinician 
that the order could not be processed because of a significant potential drug 
interaction. The alert read: 
The prescription of warfarin and TMP/Sulfa together is completely 
prohibited except in cases of urgent need for the TMP/Sulfa. If you 
are attempting to prescribe warfarin and the patient is already on 
TMP/Sulfa, discontinue theTMP/Sulfa and your order for warfarin 
will be processed. If you are attempting to prescribe TMP/Sulfa and 
feel that your patient has an urgent need, then contact the inpatient 
pharmacy and you will be directed as to how to process the order for 
TMP/Sulfa.
• Clinicians could override the alert in two ways. One way was to bypass the 
CPOE altogether by calling the pharmacist directly. The other way, which did 
not involve a pharmacist, was to enter into the computerized alert window 
that the reason for the sulfa prescription was to prevent Pneumocystis carinii 
pneumonia. Just seven alerts over the course of the study were overridden for 
this reason.
• To evaluate the effects of the nearly hard-stop alert, Strom and colleagues 
randomly assigned clinicians to either the new CPOE alert system or to 
continue with standard practice of the pharmacist notifying clinicians by phone. 
• Initially, the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board (IRB) was 
so convinced that the CPOE alert had to work, that it questioned whether it 
was ethical to conduct the study, even though the control group was current 
standard clinical practice. It eventually approved the study with a monthly 
monitoring plan in place.
• The overall impact of CPOE on patient safety depends on both the intended 
and unintended consequences of CPOE implementation. A number of studies 
have identified new errors that CPOE can introduce, such as delays in care due 
to workflow disruption or incorrect orders due to the design of the human-
computer interface.
Continued on back.
Intervention was highly 
effective in reducing 
simultaneous use of warfarin 
and  TMP/Sulfa
During the study period, clinicians ordered 8,826 prescriptions for warfarin or 
TMP/Sulfa through the CPOE system. Fifty-five clinicians triggered alerts in the 
intervention group (involving 52 patients) compared to 45 clinicians (who would 
have triggered an alert) involving 44 patients in the control group. Overall, 194 
alerts popped up in the intervention group and 148 in the control group.
• Of the 194 hard-stop alerts issued to the intervention group, the percentage of 
the desired response by the clinicians (not reordering the alert-triggering drug 
within 10 minutes of firing) was 57%, compared to 13.5% of those who would 
have triggered an alert in the control group. After adjusting for type of provider 
and clustering of providers, the intervention group was 88% less likely to re-
order the triggering drug.
• The greatest proportion of desired responses was observed in the first three 
months of the intervention, after which it steadily declined, suggesting that the 
effectiveness of the alerts may have started to wear off.  The intervention and 
control groups remained different, however, at the end of the study. 
Study halted for ethical 
reasons because of potential 
for patient harm
Each month, the investigators monitored the unintended consequences of the 
intervention. These consequences included a delay of treatment when TMP/Sulfa 
was determined to be necessary, or inadvertent discontinuation of warfarin. They 
looked for consequences that were likely or definitely related to the intervention.
• Four unintended consequences were identified among patients in the 
intervention group: a three-day delay of TMP/Sulfa treatment in one patient, a 
failure to prescribe appropriate TMP/Sulfa prophylaxis in a critically ill patient; 
and a one-day and three-day delay in warfarin treatment in two patients.
• Review of the electronic medical records of the four patients did not indicate 
any specific infectious or thrombolytic event that could have been caused by 
the delays in therapy.
• Nevertheless, the Institutional Review Board deemed these adverse 
consequences in the intervention group sufficiently serious to warrant 
discontinuation of the intervention and early termination of the study. 
This was a dramatic finding, given the IRB’s initial concern that depriving 
the control group of the intervention would be unethical.
The study included 1,971 clinicians (1,872 resident physicians and 99 nurse 
practitioners) involved in patient care at one of two hospitals affiliated with the 
University of Pennsylvania Health System. The clinicians were randomly assigned 
to either the intervention group (985 clinicians) or the control group (986 
clinicians). The study began in August of 2006 and was to last seven months. 
• The investigators defined the desired outcome as not re-ordering an alert-
triggering drug within 10 minutes of the alert (or what would have triggered 
an alert in the control group). This time frame was chosen because it was a 
reasonable period within which the clinician would have reacted to the alert. 
• They also checked for two adverse outcomes: a delay in obtaining 
TMP/Sulfa when it was indicated, and unintentional cessation of warfarin 
therapy in a patient requiring long-term warfarin therapy.
Randomized trial evaluates 
nearly hard-stop alert for 
warfarin and TMP/Sulfa
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS These results illustrate the importance of formal evaluation and monitoring for 
unintended consequences of policies intended to improve prescribing habits. 
New pharmaceuticals are subjected to evaluation of their safety and efficacy 
because their intended effects might not be achieved, or because their unintended 
effects might be harmful. Similarly, health information technology also has clinical 
effects, and ought to be evaluated too. 
• In this trial, it is not clear whether the benefits of reducing the incidence of 
concomitant prescription of warfarin and TMP/Sulfa outweigh the harms 
observed in this trial. Further review of the medical records of the patients who 
went on to receive both drugs would be needed to ascertain the adverse events 
associated with the drug interaction.
• But this study illustrates why formal evaluation should be included and 
funded as part of the push to implement health information technology. 
We cannot assume that these interventions work just because they are well 
meaning and plausible.
• The Leapfrog Group, an employer-based advocacy organization and one 
of the foremost proponents of CPOE as a patient safety intervention, recently 
called on the federal government to require testing and monitoring of CPOE 
as part of “meaningful use.”
